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Illustrating the insurer's
dilemma
The earliest mention of
"reservation of rights" in Montana
appears in a case initiated by Roland
"Laddy" Colgrove of Miles City,
one of the founding fathers of the
MTLA. FIe represented a woman
named Irion who was badly injured
in 1964 in eastem Moutana in a çol-
lision with 21957 Mercury driven
by a young ma¡r named Washing-
ton. Laddy discovered that the utle
to the Washington car had never
been propedy transfetred from the
car dealer or the body shop that
resold the car to Washington's
brother. Ironically, the same insurer,
Glens Falls Insurance Company,
insured the dealer and body shop
under separate g t ge liability poli-
cies and Washington's parents' cats
under a Family Auto Policy. Conse-
quently, at the time of the accident,
Laddy contended that Glens Falls
lnsurance Company had the obliga-
tion to defend and indemnify under
all three liability policies.
Laddy filed suit against
Washurgton, but Glens Falls re-
fused to defend or indemnifiT Wash-
ington under any policy contending
that the car was not "owned" by the
dealer or body shop so as to be in-
sured under rhe gzrage policies, and
was subject to the household exclu-
sion under the Farnily Auto Policy.
Instead, the company filed a federal
declantory action in Billings and
sought unsuccessfully to have the
federal court enjoin prosecution of
Laddy's state court actiotr pending
decision of the coverage issues.
Next, the insurer asked the Mon-
tana Supreme Court to enjoin the
state couft actlon, agaln unsuccess-
fully. Finally, on the moming the
case v/as set for trial, counsel fot
Glens Falls zppeared and took òVer
the defense of young Washington
after making "an oraf unilateral
reservation of rights"' meaning it
would defend but did not intend to
pay any loss.
One might question whether
simply appearing for uial fulfilled
the promise to defend, especially
because the trial resulted in a iudg-
ment in favor of Helen Irion for
$L40,000, alarge verdict in 19ó5.
The Montana Supreme Court, in
ffion v. Glens FaÚls Ins. Co.j later
determined that Gleirs Falls owed
coverage to Washington under all
three policies,3 a situation that
would surely provoke an attempt at
abad fzrlrh recovery today. How-
ever, nothing we would recognize as
bad faith insgrance law existed in
Montana tn 1965, and it is believed
that reservation of rights letters had
their origin in the landmark Califor-
nia case of Gray v. Zuricha in
7966. Unfortunately, the recorded
decisions do not reflect whether
Glens Falls suffered any bad faith
consequences for its conduct in the
Irion case, and Justice Sheehy, an
excellent historian who was an at-
tomey tangentially (rvolved m the
case for another insurer, could not
recall the ultimate outcome.
Failure to defend as bad faith
today
It is tempting to conclude that
such conduct would surely be bad
faith today, After all, n I9B2,in
LípínskÍ v. Tìtle fns. Co.,s the
court held that the insurer's refusal
to defend could be the basis of a
bad faith claim for punitive dam-
ages independent of the insurance
contract. In Lípinski, the title ursur-
arice company did not discover and
disclose irrigation easements to its
insured who was subsequently sued
for physically impairing thor" 
""r.-
ments on his land. The insurer, un-
der reservation of rights, defended
and settled the first action brought
against its insured but refused all
defense on the second and was ultr-
mately held in bad faith. Neverthe-
less, given the state of the law in
Montana todzy, bad faith liability
for conduct like that of Glens Falls
in the Irion case might not be so
clear. If the question framed is
whether a carcíer's prompt, but in-
correct refusal to defend and indem-
nify is bad faith, then the first in-
quiry must be whether such conduct
is forbidden by Montana's Unfair
Claims Setdement Practices Act,
MC.A. 533-18-201. There is no sub-
section in the act forbidding failure
to defend, unless the court reads it
into subsection (5) which requires
that the czttier "af{trm or deny cov-
erage of claims within a reasonable
time." While MCA $33-18-242 says
that the "insured may not bring an
action for bad faith in connection
with the handling of an insurance
clùrn," this language has been inter-
preted by the Montana Supreme
Court not to apply to coverage dis-
putes between the insurer and the
insured."6 If MCA 533-1B-201 (5)
can be read to include failure to
defend, then a claim under MCA
533 - 1, 8-242 (6) (a) can be maintarned.
ln that case, the statute allows for
punitive damages. The bad news is
it also provides the insurer ut affr-
mative defense if ithad a
"reasonable basis in law or tn fact
for contesting the claim" under 33-
1,8-242(s).
If failure to defend does not
Írt within the meaning of MC,\ $33-
18-201(5), then it could form the
basis of a corrunon law bad faith
claim. The nttonal,e in Thomas v.
l{orthwe s tetn Ày'ar7 would provide
a basis for such a cause of action. If
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a fallure to defend clarm is held not
to fit withrn the meaning of MCA
S33-18-201(5), then it would fall
within the ambit of MCA 533-18-
242(6)(^), as that section was inter-
preted by the Supreme Court in
Thomas. Suffice it to say that to-
day, the litigation over bad faith
issues in ¡he fion case would dwarf
the personal injury actron.
The reservation of rights letter
When consurners of casualty
insurance make z claim for defense
arrd indemni ficatton coverage under
their policies, they often receive
from the insurer a "reservation of
rights" letter reserving the right not
to indemnify particular claims for
lack ofcoverzge ot because they are
excluded. Sometimes the letters re-
cite a l.itany of possible reasons the
insurer rnaylater choose to deny
coverage. Always the letters produce
anxiety in the insured consumer
who purchased the policy to protect
against liability for loss to others
and from having to pay the defense
costs involved in a claim against them
or their business.
The injured plaintiff likely also
has a keen interest in any reservation
of rights, since indemnity payment
under the tortfeasor's casualty insur-
ance is most often the plarntrffs only
realistic source of recovery. The
plaintifFs lawyer representing the in-
lured victim in initiating the claim
may often be privy to information
about a coverage dispute, either
through discovery from the defendant
or through cooperation with defen-
dant's petsonal counsel. Plaintìff s
counsel should realize rhat appear
ance of a reservation of rights letter
rnzy mear, the injured client will not
receive adequate compensation
through settlement or satisfaction of
the verdict with an insurer's check,
but may have to settle for an assþ-
ment of the defendant insured's po-
tential rights against its insurer in bacl
faith tort for the insurer's refusa] to
provide coverage, defense, or both.
The fact is that the unilatera.l
reservation of rights letter and its
countetpart, the "non-waiver"
agreement between insured and in-
surer, both may plzy an important
role in negotiations. The insurer,
armed wìth either one, may wield
an effective bargaining chip that
may reduce the value of the claim
given the possibility that, if the
insurer is right, there may be no
insurance coverage in the end.
Courts have developed a sub-
stantial body of law around these
reservation of rights letters and
their import on the duty to defend
and indemnify. In this issue,I will
examine some of that law insofar as
it creates rights in the insured and
obligations for the insurer. However,
I will save the insurer's duty to settle
for a futrxe issue, noting only that
G ary ZaÅrck concludes thar. a carier
defending under reservation of rights
may not ask its insured for contri-
bution to a settlement unless it has
contributed the lrnits of its coverage.
Nrf
. Personal Injury
. \Øorkers Compensation
Montana Owned . CallLes Marsh
. Environmental Cleanup
& Asset Conservation, lnc.
. Policy Buy Outs
1-BOO-B33- 4395
Serviæ
Risk
q
#23 5fi Street Nonh
8ox1792. Creat Falls, MT 59403
40&761 4957 o Fax 40M54-991 4
Prcn 24 TnTALTRENDS - SuMMER 2001
Function of the reservation of
rights letter
The insured a¡rd the insurer
may disagree on whether the policy
provides defense and indemnity for
some or all of the claims reported.
The insurer has a duty to inform
the insured of its positron regarding
coverage and defense. The basis of
this duty is the insured's interest in
making informed decisions to pro-
tect itself from the underlying
claim.T It is an essenti'¿l princìple of
law that, if an insurer elects to de-
fend its policyholder without re-
servurg its right to assert policy de-
fenses to its obligatron to pay, it
may be later precluded from doing
so." 
-[ fence, the reservatìon of rights
letter has become the formal way
an insurer undertakes defense while
reserving the right to assert that the
claim falls outside coverage either
because it is not covered by the ba-
sic insuring agreement or is subject
to al exclusion.
There is a distrnction be-
tween a reservation of rights letter
ald the "non-waiver agreement.'>
The reservation of rights letter is a
unilateral statement of the insurer.
The puqposes of the reservation of
rights letter are to protect the in-
surer from claims that it has waived
policy defenses or is estopped from
asserting them and to gtve notice to
the insured of potenti.al coverage
problems. The non-waiver agree-
ment, on the other hand, is an
agreement between the insured
and ir-rsurer in which the insurer
resetes its policy defenses ard the
insured attempts to secure defense.
Standards for the reservation of
rights letter
There exists a standard of
care That insurers should meet in
issuing reservation of rights letters.
Some recoinrnendations arc for
protection of the insurer, while
others protect the insured. For
example, Clinton E. Miller, al¡oard
certlf,red fotensic examiner and
national insurance litrgation consul-
tant,'sets forth the following stan-
dards that should be of interest to
the insured:
After the insurer has com-
pleted a prompt, thorough,
and objective coverage
evaluation, the reservation
of rights letter must openly
and honestly disclose to the
insured all possible policy
defenses the insurer knows
it may potentrally raise.
. The information given to the
insured in the reservatron of
rights letter should include, at
least, the following:
x date of loss
x policy number
x claim number
x specific policy provisions
involved in the coverage
dispute, whether they are an
exclusion, condition, or
definition
. Any coverage question must be
clearly defìned.
' The insured must be informed
of rights to retain personal
counsel in view of the conflict
that exists between the insured
and the insurer.
Miller believes the reservation
of rights letter must conform to
three elemental requirements:
l- It must be communicated to the
insured in writing, cettified
mail, return receipt requested.
2 lt must be timely, meaning as
soon as policy defenses are
recognized in the course of a
prompt, thorough, and objec-
tive investigation.
3 It must adequately and fairly
inform the insured of the nature
of the coverage disBute and the
insurer's positron.r
Robert I(elly agrees and says
the insurer should explain in the
letter why the provision, when ap-
plied to the facts, may result ur de-
nial of coverage.tt He recommends
that the letter "quote the relevant
policy language that is to be the
basis for a potential denial of policy
benefits in the future." Also, he
believes the letter should acknowl-
edge receipt of notice of the claim
and confirrn the dollar lrnits of
covefages.
Reservation of rights under the
Unfair Trade Practices Act
Assumrng that the insured has
provided trmely notice of claim to
the insurance company, it has initial
duties under the clarm settlement
practices section of the Montana
Insurance Code, MCA 533-18-20i.
First, it must conduct a "reasonable
investigation based upon al| avall-
able information," and second, it
must "affirm or deny coverage of
claims within a reasonable time."
Some view these as competing
demarrds that result in avztfable
coverage defenses and grounds for
denial being left out of reservation
of rights letters. '' However, in
Montan4 the company is cleady
required to notify the nsured of its
position. ln Portal Pipelíne Co. v.
Stonewall fns. Co.,'u the court said:
It is well established in Mon-
tana that an insurer has an
obligation to inform the in-
sured of all policy defenses it
intends to rely upon. Section
33-18-201(14) MCA, of the
Unfair Trade Practices 
'\ctprovides that an insurer may
not:
"[Flail to promptly provide
a reasonable explanation of
the basis in the insurance
policy in relation to the
facts or applicable law for
denial of a claitrn..."
However, the court also held
thatan excess carcier has no duty to
make reservation of rights during
the primary carrier's defense under
its policy, if the excess carrier did
not have the duty to defend or
undertake defense.
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Timeliness of the reservation The insurerts options after in the Texas czse of Patadígm Ins.
of rights investigation Co. v. Texas Ríchmond Corp.rtt
Timeliness of the reservation The primary carrier which has noted that, where the insurer under-
of rights letter is govemed by MC'\ completed its initial investigation takes defense without a reservarion
533-18-201(5), which says that the essentially has three options: of rights letter, coverage could be
insurer may not "Fail to afftrrn ot 1 Defend the policyholder with- created under the doctrines of
deny coverage of claims within a out reservation. If the claim waiver and estoppel. Consequentl¡
reasonable tjme after proof of loss falls in the policy language and it is in the interest of þe insured
statements have been completed." the carrier has no policy de- and the injured claimant for the
Montana law tells us little about the fenses, it will undertake defense insurer to undertake defense with-
limits of "a rea- out issuing an
sonable time." appropriate
The court reservation of
estopped Safeço The court held that, by reason of its conduct, rights at the right
from assertìng Safeco was estopped to deny coverage, so that dme, because
policy exclusions Ellinghouse u¡as owed defense and indemnity. coverage may
when it withdrew thereby come
from defense af- into existence
ter representing like light upon
its ìnsured in a wrongful death ac- with the expectation that it will the darkness
tion for 18 months without a reser- indemnify the insured for any Estoppel requires proof of
vation of rights.'o The court cited loss. ¡{.s will be seen, if it elects detrimentaL reliancã on the part of
the Washington case of this option, it cannot raise pol- the insured that forecloses an in-
Transametica fns. Gtoup v. i.y defenses later. surer from asserting policy defenses.
Chubb & Son, Inc.,554P.2d 2 Undertake defense under a Under estoppel principles, rhe car-
1080 (1976), which afftrrrred an reservation of rights. If the rier should only be precluded from
estoppel where the insuter de- claim appears on its face to fall asserting a coverage defense in the
fended for ten months without a under the policy language but absence of a reservation of rights, if
reservation of rights. Ilowever, the the carrier believes the facts will the insured can show ptejudice
inner limit of time in which a car- ultimately show it does not, it (detrimental reliance) ãs a result of
rier should reasonably issue the must issue a reservation of the insurer's conduct. IIowever, in
letter is not clear. Florida gives rights letter before undetaking Safeco fns. Co. v. Ellínghouse,re
carriers 30 days ftom the time they defense to preserve its policy the Montana Supreme Court
knew or should h¿ve known of the defenses and the option of adopted the general rule from
defense to provide its insured the refusing to indemnify for loés. Couch, Insurance 2d,51,.85 (2d ed.
reservation of, rights, or 60 days to 3 Disclaim any oblþtion to 1982):
refuse in writing to defend, enter a defend or indemnify based on Vühere an insurer, without
non-waive agreement, or obtain policy defenses. If the claim reservadon and with actual or
mutually agreeable independent does not fall within the policy ptesumed knowledge, as-
counsel.'" Vrginia requires that the language, the carrier can sumes the exclusive control
insurer reserve its rights within 20 "disclaim" coverage and refuse of the defense of claims
days of the insurer's discovery of defense or indemnity . agatrrst the insured, it cannot
the insured,s breach of the insur- thereafter withdraw and deny
ance policy contract, if the carrier Defending the policyholder liability under the policy on
intenås to relv on that breach to without reservation: the the gtound of non-coverage,
deny coveraç .'u Califotrtiarequires doctrines of waiver and estoppel preiudice to the insured by
the notified insurer to "accept or If the carrier defends *itno.rt virtue of the insurer's as-
deny the claim in whole o, in p-t, a reservation of rights, it will be sumption of the defense be-
and,affirnor deny liability''within 40 estopped from later u.r.*l"g 
-y ing in this situation' conclu-
days. The fartthitrecommendations policy clefense to avoid indemnifica- sively presumed"' the loss of
about timeliness use such terrns as tion. It is said that the doctrines of the right of the insured to
'þrompr" and "immedirrtn iTt* iui,r., and estoppel .^";;Ë;' |,',i:ilfr.]åîåi the case
cate a reasonable time would be coverage where it did not exist un- 1,.,, ., : a r
measured inamattetof weeks. der the policy. llowever, the court Lonsequenuy' ln Montana'
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the prejudice will be presumed
when the insurer has assumed ex-
clusive control of the defense. In
EllÍnghousg which is Montana's
best example of a case of estoppel,
Safeco's insured, Ellinghouse, was
sued for wrongful death under a
commercial generaì liability policy.
Safeco accepted coverage of the
claim without question or reserva-
tion of rights and retained an attor-
ney who undetook defense of
Ellinghouse for 18 months. Safeco's
chief examiner later concluded that
coverage was excluded by exclu-
sions to the CGL policy. Accord-
ingl¡ during the defense, Safeco's
adjuster secured Ellinghouse's sþ
nature on a purported non-waiver
agreement, and the company later
withdrew from representation for-
mally denying coverage l-B months
after the claim was initiated. The
court held thaq by reason of its
conduct, Safeco was estopped to
deny coverage, so that Ellinghouse
was owed defense and indemnity.
Safeco's conduct resulted in a $5.¡
million jury verdict later reduced by
the Montana Supreme Court.'o
Waiver of defenses by failure to
issue reservation of rights letter
The Montana Supreme Court
defined waiver in Osbome v.
Supteme Lodge, Iftiights of
Pythías v. fnsutance Depart
m.nt' saying a. "waiver" ionsists
of the intentional relinquishment of
a known rþht and cannot exist un-
less the pany affected has knowl-
edge of the subject matter or, by
reasofl of the circumstances, knowl-
edge is imputed to him. Though
many courts speak of waiver where
the insurer has undertaken defense
without a reservation of rights,
waiver probably does not apply. The
czrciet isn't really overtly relinquish-
ing a known right nor would the
canier intentionally waiv e a cover-
age defense rvhere the result would
createcoverage it doesn't believe
exlsts.*
If the carrier believes it owes
no coverage, it must defend under
formal reservation of rights or file a
declaratory judgment regarding its
obligations to its insured. Recently,
Safeco followed that procedure in
Safeco Ins. Co. ofAmerica v.
Líss.'u lts insured, a woman named
Liss, shot another woman, Bruthers,
when she caught her riding in the
cab of a road grader with her hus-
band. Liss contended her shooting
Bruthers was accidental, so Safeco
issued a reservation ofrights letter
and provided Liss a defense until it
could secure a declqratoty judgment
that it had no coverage. The District
Court granted summary judgment
in Safeco's favor. Flowever, the
Montana Supreme Court oveftumed
it on the ground that there was a
material issue of fact regarding the
intentional or accidental nature of
the shooting. Nevertheless, as the
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court said n CÍty of Bozeman v,
AfU rns. Co,r'o "aïr insuret may
step out of a suit once it cleady and
unequivocally demonstrates that the
plaintiffs claim against the insuted
no longer falls within the policy's
coverzge."
If the duty to pzy the judg-
ment may not be determmed until
the origrnal action is completed, and
the pleadings stàte z cause that fits
within the policy coverage, then the
czrrter has a duty to defend. In
^Iotthwestem 
Nat, Cas, Co. v.
Phalenr2s the carrier undertook
defense under a reservation of rights
letter and then secured sufllmary
judgment that it had no duty to
defend the action by the victim of
its insured's assault. The nsured
apparently took no action to secure
defense by Northwestern, but the
victrm did, contending that Nortli-
western waived its rights by assum-
ing defense of the action. The dis-
trict court had granted the insurer
summary iudgment on the strength
of the insured's plea of guilty to the
crimrnal charge. The Supreme Court
reversed holding that the plea of
guilty to the criminal charge does
not conclusively preclude the policy
coverage. Nor is the duty to defend
affected by the insured's lack of in-
terest in the tort actìon or the
declaratory fudgment action. Said
the court, "The injuted pafty's
rights as a clzimant vested at the
time of the accident a¡rd could not
be affected by nondefense ofan
action brought by the insurer to
rescind the insurance policy."26 The
coutt found surnmary judgment to
be improper because, in the court's
view, applicability of coverage could
l\I$ an0ther day in
&'
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not be determined until the undedying tort action was
completed.
Disclaiming any duty to defend or indemni$
If the carrier's position is strong enough, itrnay
deny coverage entirely and refuse to defend leaving
the rnsured with the decision whether it is viable to
file any action to enforce rights agarnst the carrier. The
court made clear in City of Bozeman v. AfU fns.
Co., "Ordinartly, a liability insurer has no duty to
defend an action against its insured when the claim or
complaint c.leady falls outside the scope of the policy's
coverap5e.""'And, in fnsurcd TÍtles, fnc. v. McDon-
aldl" rhe court said, "If the asserted claim is llot cov-
ered by the policy, then the insurer has no duty to de-
fend the insured." I¡ Burns v. Undetwdterc Adiust-
ing Co.r'o the insured, Burns, presented the carrier
with a lawsuit for injury caused by his battering of the
pl ainti ff, Zetl,er. In respons e, U nderwriters is sued
Burns a reservation of dghts letter (a "'disclaimer')
denying coverage for the intentional act. After Bums
plead guilty to felony aggravzted assault, Underwriters
issued additional resewation of rights letters
(disclaimers) denying coverage and refused to take up
any defense. The Montana Supreme Court held there
was no duty to defend.
If the company determines that there is no
coverage and elects not to defend or indemnify, it
must send a letter of disclaimer and state its defenses
with specificity just as m the reservation of rights.31 In
such cases, it is a well-setrled rule that failure to assert
a ground in the disclaimer waives that ground.32
Once the carcier determines that the existence
of coverage is questionable, it should, because of its
fiduciary relationship with its insured, refrain from
conducting further investigation by getting informa-
tion directly from its insured. An India¡ra Court of
Appeals, in Snodgrass v. Baize,so differenuated be-
tween statements taken from the insured in initial
investigation and those obtarned after the coverage
conflict is discovered and disclosed to the insured,
holding that the former could be used to deny cover-
age while the latter would be subject to estoppel.
The company must cofiununicate the reserva-
tion of rights to the insured md^faiÃy inform the
insured of the catrier's position.'* The insurer must act
"openly and with the utmost loyalty to its insured...in
initially explaining the insurer's position... and must
make specific refetence to the policy defense which
may ultimately be asserted."" The company rnust set
forth for the insured everJ reasorÌ of which it is aware
that constitutes a basis for denying or limiting cover-
age and must do so with specificity. General state-
ments that Íhe carcter intends to reserve all rþhts it
has under its policy are inadequate. Supplementation
of the resewation of rights letter to state additional
bases for refusing coverage must not be preiudicial to
the insured."" Subsection 14 of Montana's Unfair
Claim Settlement Practices Act3t requires that the in-
surer "promptly provide a reasonable explanation of
the basis in the insurance policy in relation to the facts
or applicable law for denial of a claim or for the offer
of a compromise settlement."
The duty to defend
When the compaûy sends a reservation of rights
letter, it has an rmmediate duty to defend, even if the
claim is a "mixed action" in which some claims .¿re
covered and others are not. In the Califomia Supreme
Court case of Aetoiet-Generaí Corp. v. Transport
fndem. Co.rut the court said, "The insurer has a pro-
phylactrc duty to defend the entire mixed clarm. That
is because to defend meaningfully, it must defend im-
mediately, and to defend immediately, it must defend
entirely." Miller describes as "insarìe" the practice of
many insurers of issuing reservation of rights letters
and then embarking on a monthsJong investrgation
without undertaking the defense. FIe says, "Nowhere
in the insurance policy does it say that the insuratce
compafiy can ponder its navel for months before
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peßonally rcvlew your medlcal rccords,
fotmulate opinions, and
match expetts to your
cases from our careîully
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cornmitting to eithet defending the insured or declin-
ing coverage. The duty to defend is a contractual duty
and it must be honored upon the tender of the com-
plaint to the insurance company." Miller contends
that, if the insurer took six months to decide not to
defend, then they owe the insured six months of
defense costs for the period the insured had to defend
himself. Consistently, if the insurer, under reservation
of rights, defends clarms not even potentially covered,
then it carì recover those defense costs." If the under-
lying claims are based on theodes of recovery rhatare
broader than the exclusion on which the insurer seeks
to deny coverage, then the insurer must defend and
can simply reserve the right not to indemnify on the
excluded claims or share duties with independent
co-corrrrsel.oo
The conflict created by the reservation of
rights letter
Generally, defense of most claims under casu-
alty policies does not involve a conflict between the
insured and the insurer. Competent insurance defense
counsel advise their insurers that counsel owe their
primary duty to the insureds and give little weight to
the interests of the insurer in litigatìon. In Montan4
insurers'attempts to control defense and costs of
defense have been held to be the unauthorized prac-
tice of law.at Counsel generally zealously defends the
insured, does not consider the interests of the insurer,
and takes no actions adverse to the interests of the
insured.o'F{owever, when a situation develops ur
which a conflict may exist between the interests of the
insured and the insurer, defense counsel may recom-
mend that the insurer obtain separate counsel to
represent the company's interest, or in the case of
many coverage disputes, recommend the insurer issue
a reservation of rights letter and inform the insured
that the insured may wish to seek the advice of irde-
perrdent counsel. When an insurer receives a claim,
one of its f,rrst duties is to deterrnine whether there is
any such conflict of interest between it and its insured.
If there is, the insurer must deal with the conflict and
may ultimately have to hire independent counsel for
its insured.
In a coverage dispute, where the insurer issues
its reservation of rights and then proceeds to defend,
there is an automatic conflict between the interests of
insured and insurer. Obviously, where the carrier's
position is that some or all of the claims are not
covered, thereby gvrng notice that it does not intend
to indemnify, the conflict is clear. In In Re Rule of
Prcfessional Conductas The Monta¡ra Supreme
Court recognized rhzt a potential conflict of interest
exists where the insurer provides defense subject to a
reservation of rights. ,A.bsent a negotiated agreement
between the insured and insurer as to how to proceed,
the insurer must elect an option, and the insured's
personal counsel must make demand on the carcier
for the option which will best protect the insured.
Resolution of the reservation of rights conflict
Coufts have used different approaches to the
duty owed the insured by the insurer where the insurer
believes thzt a cle.:¡m for which the insured demands
indemnity and defense dcjes not fall within the policy
coverage. Unless the claim on its face is cleady out-
side the coverage, the insurer questioning coverage
but exercising prudence will provide the insured with
a reservation of rights and proceed with the defense.
There is variation in the duty courts place on the
44^insurer, however.* Some a-llow an insurer to refuse
defense and still preserve the right to later litigate the
coverage,issue after the insured has conducted the
defense.o'This leaves the insured bearing the costs of
defense unless a court should ultimately decide later
that the insurer was responsible. Other courts decide
that, in the face of a coverage conflict, the insurer
must defend, but that neither insured nor insurer are
foreclosed from subsequently litigating the coverage
issue.ou This leaves the insurer bearing the costs of
defense with little hope of recouping the costs if the
court ultimately decides that there v/as no coverage.
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The problem is that the insurer which undertakes the
defense in the face of a coverage dispute is ethically
bound not to act in its urterest to the detriment of the
ir-rsured by developing through fact investigatìon or
discovery the facts necessa{y to prove lack ofcover-
ug".ot Cor,t"quently, a third line of decisions repre-
sãr-rted by the landmatk "Cumís"casett would forbid
the insurer in the coverage dispute ftom undertaking
the defense of the insured but would require that the
insuret pay the costs of defense^ and provide the in-
sured an independe.rt counsel.oo In California this
procedure ir rtatutory.to
Intetestingly, the Montana Supreme Court, in
the 1.967 case of St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.. Co.
v. Thompson,tt upp.ott to have concluded that State
Farm had to pay attomey fees for independent coun-
sel for its insured. In that case, ân employer (insuted
by St. Paul) and its employee, Thornpson, (insured by
State Farm) were sued for ioint liability for bodily
injury arising out of an auto accident in which
"lhompson drove his own car while working. State
Farm paid out its limits in aiotrt settlement, after
which St. Paul sued Thompson on the employer's sub-
rogated claim for conttibution. Thompson demanded
defense from State Farm which refused, citing the fact
that it had paid out its limit for inderrurity. The court
held that the duty to defend was independent of the
duty to indemnify and that State Farm owed the duty
to defend. The court then went on to say:
But, State Farrn argues that it should be allowed
to defend rather than plyrl'tgcounsel to
defend the action. There can be no question
of the good faithmd sincere defense by
counsel for State Farm in the Welch suit nor
here. However, the inconsistent and yes,
antagonistic positions that have developed
make it clear that Thompson was requited
to hire his own counsel. No issue as to the
amount of damages is involved.
Though the exact dispute the court was
discussing is unclear, it appears that the couft was
ordering State Farm to pay $2,500 attomey fees for
its insured's independent counsel in a situation where
State Farm thought its attomeys should be allowed to
defend, but the coutt found the insurer's position
inconsistent ardanøgonistic to that o[its insured.
The Monta¡ra court's approach appears to be consis-
tent with Cumíswhich was not decided until 1984.
There is no conflict if the insurer elects to
defend unconditionally (without reservation of rights)
since estoppel will later prevent the insurer from with-
drawing defense."' FIowever, if the insurer defends
under reservation of rights, there is potentral conflict,
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since the carrter may only be con-
cemed about the interim costs of
defending while the insured must
worry about the ultimate cost and
payment of loss.
Windt asserts that issuance of
a reservation of rights does not nec-
essarily mea¡r that a conflict exists
such that the carrier will lose the
right to select counsel. He stâtes that
a conflict exists only if a coverzge
issue will later be determined by
facts in the lawsuit being defended
and the outcome can be controlled
by defense counsel. But, he notes
that a conflict can arise with regard
to the conduct of the insured's de-
fense,uo
Specifically, a conflict ovet
the existence of coverage
will serve to create a corr'
flict of interest with rcgard
to the insured's defense
when' the insurer's potential
liability could be reduced if
the insured were defended
in apal-Î)cular manfler.
As an example, he cites the
situation whete plaintrff has plead
alternate theories of negligence and
intentional conduct and it would be
in the insurer's interest and against
the insured's interest to develop
facts showins that the conduct was
. s+"^intentional.'* Such a conflict would
require that the in,sured select inde-
pendent counsel.tt
Conclusion
The stakes can be high and
the risk great when the insurance
company and its insured who is be-
ing sued disagree on whether there
is coverage for defense or indem-
nity. Issues ofcoverage are ofgrave
conÒem to,plaintiffg counsel who
must secure adequate compensaúon
for the injured claimant even if that
means settling for an assignment of
the policyholder's bad faith rights
agafrst the insurer fot failing to
defend or indemni$'.'A specific
body of law and standard of care has
developed around the reservation of
rights letters and the duty to defend.
It is imperative that counsel for the
policyholder and for the injured
plaintiff be vigilant in observing the
carrier's conduct rn disclaiming
coverage, reserving rights to deny
coverage, and defendtrg under
reservation of rights to insure that
standards are met. Counsel must be
attentive to the possibility that the
insurer can be estopped from assert-
ing an otherwise valid policy defense
or carr be held to have waived an
exclusion or other defense. Counsel
may literally be able to create cover-
age where noue existed if the carrier
is careless.
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